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Abstract: This paper addresses the complete absence of detailed information on, and analysis of, the
financial aspects of Ireland’s road public–private partnership (PPP) programme to date. We focus on
the eight hard toll roads in operation by 2010 and provide a financial analysis of their performance.
Although privately financed we find that projects also received considerable public money. Whereas
four projects are profitable, the other four have accumulated significant losses. The risk premia paid to
profitable projects and the potential renegotiations that may be necessary for loss-making projects raise
questions as to whether value for money can be achieved. We conclude with a number of policy
recommendations.
I INTRODUCTION
Increased private sector participation in the financing and delivery of publicinfrastructure services is by no means a recent phenomenon, but it has expanded
phenomenally over the last twenty years in Europe following the pioneering private
finance initiative (PFI) in the UK. European Investment Bank (EIB) data show that
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1,765 public–private partnership (PPP) contracts were signed in the EU from 1990
to 2016, representing a capital value of almost €356 billion. While the global
financial crisis had a significant negative impact on the PPP market, the volume of
deals closed resumed growth relative quickly and over 520 contracts were signed
between 2009 and 2016. Fixed capital formation through PPP projects has become
big enough to have macroeconomic and systemic significance in a number of
countries such as Portugal and Spain, in addition to the UK (Blanc-Brude et al.,
2009). 
Ireland also ranks among the small group of countries where PPP has made an
appreciable contribution to overall public infrastructure investment. Comparative
international data indicate that the extent of PPP procurement in Ireland is relatively
high. Burger and Hawkesworth (2011) surveyed PPP activity in OECD countries
and reported that in Ireland, PPP accounts for between 5 and 10 per cent of overall
investment in infrastructure. Macário et al. (2015) surveyed PPP activity in Europe
and found that Ireland’s total cumulative PPP investment (up to 2009) accounted
for over 7 per cent of GDP (measured in 2013). Ireland exceeded the average level
of investment in the EU (5 per cent) and ranked third amongst the countries included
in their analysis.
Road infrastructure accounted for a significant majority of the value of
contracted PPP projects in Ireland prior to the slowdown in PPP activity precipitated
by the global financial crisis. Moreover, since the revival of the Irish PPP market
circa 2012-2013, five incremental PPP contracts for new road infrastructure have
been signed (see Reeves and Palcic, 2017). Despite the ongoing contribution of
PPP to the much needed development of road infrastructure in Ireland, there has
been a distinct scarcity of government-led and independent analysis of whether
road PPPs have achieved key policy objectives such as accelerated delivery of
assets, achievement of value for money (VFM) and efficient allocation of risks and
improved project-cycle management of important public infrastructure.
This paper seeks to address the complete absence of detailed information on,
and analysis of, the financial aspects of Ireland’s road PPP programme. Following
a review of relevant literature on the history of PPP procurement in the European
context, the paper describes the extent of road infrastructure procured as PPPs in
Ireland to date. It proceeds to conduct a financial analysis of the road PPPs that
became operational by 2010. This analysis provides details of the financial structure
of the deals completed and the payments made by government to support these
projects. We then use financial ratios that focus on the companies’ income, costs
and the returns to the providers of finance. The paper concludes with a discussion
of results and a set of policy recommendations. 
218                                     The Economic and Social Review
II BACKGROUND: INCREASED FINANCING AND FUNDING OF
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE IN EUROPE
Meeting the demand for improved transport infrastructure is a major problem faced
by governments around the world. Although private participation in various aspects
of road infrastructure has a long history (Bel and Fageda, 2005; Grimsey and Lewis,
2007), there has been a surge in private involvement in recent years. Albalate (2014)
identified three major trends in the new wave of private involvement in the
motorway industry in Europe: 
(1) The privatisation of motorways managed by government through publicly
owned concessionaires: Over the period 1998-2006, there have been
significant sales of stakes in publicly owned motorway concessions in
Portugal, Italy, Spain and France. Since the global financial crisis, Greece
has also put public concessions up for sale. 
(2) Concession awards (of different kinds) that have underpinned the
extension of the motorway network: For example, in the form of design,
build, operate, finance and manage (DBFOM) projects based on hard tolls,
shadow tolls related to traffic volumes, or availability payments, which have
been signed in a number of countries such as Hungary, Ireland, Poland and
the UK.
(3) The privatisation of the existing motorway network by the introduction
of tolls on existing networks: This has taken place in Germany since the
decision to introduce user payments in 2005 (originally introduced for heavy
goods vehicles). Similar approaches have been adopted in Austria, the Czech
Republic (since 2006), Slovakia (since 1996), Serbia (since 2005), as well
as Slovenia and Croatia. 
It is clear that the significant expansion of private sector participation in the
European road network since the early 2000s has encompassed a variety of
arrangements based on different approaches to constructing, operating, managing,
financing and funding projects. The label PPP is commonly applied to these
different arrangements and it is evident that different PPP types are now used within
and across European countries. The mix of PPP arrangements makes it difficult to
gauge the precise amount of PPP activity in terms of value or number of road
projects. 
Blanc-Brude et al. (2007) reviewed PPP activity in Europe before the collapse
of PPP markets in the wake of the global financial crisis. They concentrated on PPP
projects that are long term, risk sharing contracts between public and private parties
and include the bundling of design, construction, operation and/or maintenance,
together with a major component of private finance. In the UK, which had the most
mature PPP market, the transportation sector – including airports, bridges, rail, road,
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and urban railways – only accounted for 6 per cent of the number of PPP contracts
to reach financial close. In value terms, however, the transportation sector accounted
for 36 per cent of the total largely due to the London Underground PPP contracts
(which subsequently collapsed). In the rest of Europe the transportation sector
accounted for 60 per cent of projects signed and over 84 per cent of value. Within
the transport sector, road PPPs dominated, accounting for 60 per cent of the number
of projects and 67 per cent of value. 
It is evident that before the economic crisis the PPP market in mainland Europe
was dominated by very large motorway and fixed link projects. This feature of PPP
activity also applies to the case of Ireland. Reeves (2015) reported that nine road
PPP projects accounted for 80 per cent of the aggregate contracted capital value of
the entire PPP programme that was operational in Ireland as of 2013, which also
spanned other sectors including water and wastewater treatment, schools and court
buildings. The following section provides details on the procurement of road
infrastructure (mainly motorway) in Ireland since Ireland’s first PPP programme
was announced in 1999.
III THE USE OF PPPS FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF ROAD
INFRASTRUCTURE IN IRELAND TO DATE
Information provided by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform shows
that as of April 2018, there were 24 privately financed PPP contracts in 
operation with a further eight projects in construction or procurement across sectors
including: transport (motorways and services areas); justice (court buildings);
education (schools and a new third-level campus); environment (incineration);
tourism (a national convention centre); health (primary care centres) and 
social housing. The capital value of these projects amounts to over €5.7 billion
with road transport projects accounting for over 60 per cent (€3.4 billion) of this
total. 
The origins of Ireland’s road PPP programme can be traced back to the
recognition of the comparatively poor quality of the Irish roads network at the turn
of the millennium. At that time, the Irish Department of Finance (2000) published
an appraisal of the nature of the country’s infrastructural deficiencies. With respect
to roads infrastructure, the appraisal highlighted the underdeveloped state of the
motorway network. In 1996 the network had reached just 13 per cent of an EU
index weighted for population and land area, which was by far the lowest 
figure for any EU Member State. The National Roads Programme 2000-2006,
which set out plans to increase the proportion of the network accounted for by
motorways, identified PPP as the model of procurement for a number of individual
road projects. 
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Table 1: Road PPP Projects in Operation by 2010
Project                                     Contract       Contract       Date of    Contract  Contract
                                                      type             award       operation       end        Values
                                                                                                                                  (€m)
N1/M1 Dundalk 
Western Bypass                     Concession     Feb. 2004    Sept. 2005     2034       112.6
M4 Kilcock-Kinnegad           Concession     Mar. 2003    Dec. 2005      2033       301.8
M8 Rathcormac Fermoy 
Bypass                                   Concession     Jun. 2004     Oct. 2006      2034       182.7
N25 Waterford Bypass          Concession     Apr. 2006    Oct. 2009      2036       262.3
N6 Ballinasloe East/
Oranmore PPP                       Concession     Apr. 2007    Dec. 2009      2037       297.8
M7/M8 Portlaoise                 Concession     Jun. 2007     May 2010      2037       300.1
M3 Clonee Kells                   Concession     Apr. 2007    Jun. 2010      2052       521.2
N7 Limerick Tunnel              Concession     Aug. 2006   Jul. 2010       2041       382.5
M50 Upgrade                        DBFOM         Feb. 2006    Sep. 2010      2042       219.1
Source: National Roads Authority/Transport Infrastructure Ireland; Department of Public
Expenditure and Reform.
Table 1 shows that between 2003-2007 procurement for nine road projects was
finalised. Approximately 300 kilometres of motorway on major inter-urban routes
have been constructed using the PPP model, and PPP projects accounted for almost
one-third of Ireland’s motorway network in 2015. Eight of the nine PPPs in
operation by 2010 were procured as concession DBFOM contracts with one
procured as an availability payment-based DBFOM contract.1 The National Roads
Authority (NRA, now Transport Infrastructure Ireland (TII)) conducted the
procurement process for all PPP projects and acted as the contracting party in
contrast to conventional contracts, which are signed by the local authorities. The
eight concession contracts secured the majority of payment via a combination of
construction grants and operational payments from the NRA and direct tolls.
Concessionaires assumed demand risk in all but two cases where the NRA have
agreed traffic guarantees whereby it compensates the private concessionaire if
traffic falls below fixed thresholds. 
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1 DBFOM = Design, Build, Finance, Operate and Maintain. In a concession contract the
concessionaire is reimbursed either partially or fully through user fees (tolls). In an
availability payment-based contract there are no user fees and the private partner is instead
remunerated through regular payments by the public partner.
To date, there has been no comprehensive government-sponsored appraisal of
the PPP experience in Ireland, with the minor exception of a VFM report by the
Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) on the first PPP Schools project procured
in Ireland (C&AG, 2004). Most of the analysis to date has been published by
independent researchers and has concentrated on PPPs in sectors such as: social
housing (Hearne, 2011); water infrastructure (Reeves, 2011); roads (Burke and
Demirag, 2015) and schools (Reeves, 2008). This paper seeks to address the scarcity
of analysis of PPP usage in Ireland. It focuses entirely on the roads sector and
analyses the structure of PPP deals in Ireland in terms of the composition of PPP
companies and the financial structure of PPP deals, focusing in particular on the
precise mix of public and private finance. It examines the nature and extent of
payments by the NRA to the PPP companies and the income, costs, profits and
return to shareholders. The following section reviews previous studies in the
international literature that have conducted financial analyses of PPPs and roads
PPP in particular.
IV PREVIOUS FINANCIAL ANALYSES OF PPPS
The prevalence of PPP usage over the last 25 years has been the focus of a growing
body of research covering financial and economic aspects, as well as relevant issues
around politics, governance and project management. Financial analysis of PPP
projects has covered the appraisal methodologies used to establish whether or not
PPP delivers VFM compared to traditional procurement methods. Some authors
have provided general discussions of issues relevant to VFM appraisal (e.g.
Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Morralos and Amekudzi, 2008), whereas others have
provided more critical perspectives on the topic (e.g. Ball et al., 2007; Heald, 2003). 
With respect to roads and motorways, there is a sizable body of literature
concentrating on PPP and the private financing of such infrastructure. The majority
of these studies cover aspects such as the rationale for PPP, the details of
procurement and descriptions of various projects (e.g. Glaister, 1999; Debande,
2002). It is noteworthy that these studies tend to view private finance and PPP in a
positive (although sometimes cautious) light. However, only a small number of
studies provide empirical evidence based on rigorous economic and financial
analysis to support the use of PPP and private finance. 
Examples of evidence-based studies include Blanc-Brude et al. (2009) who use
data on 227 road projects (including 65 PPPs) financed by the EIB to compare the
ex-ante construction costs of projects procured by traditional and PPP approaches.
Using ordinary least squares regression analysis the authors found the ex-ante unit
construction cost of a road to the public sector is estimated to be 24 per cent higher
in a PPP than in traditional public procurement. As this magnitude is similar to the
cost overruns that are typically observed in traditional public procurement in the
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2 A comparative analysis of financial performance that included the M50 PPP project was not possible due
to the significant differences in the availability payment based structure of this contract.
European road sector, the authors find that this difference is largely attributable to
the premium paid to transfer construction risks. 
Shaoul et al. (2006) used a case-study approach to conduct an aggregate
financial analysis of the first eight design, build, finance and operate (DBFO) roads
procured by the UK Government Highways Agency. They analysed accounting
information mainly sourced from the Highways Agency and the accounts of the
special purpose vehicle (SPV) companies created for each DBFO contract for the
first six years of the relevant 30-year contracts. The authors found that within three
years the Highways Agency had paid more than the aggregate construction cost of
the projects and that in four of the six years analysed the effective cost of capital
was higher than the cost of public finance. A further key contribution of this study
was the demonstration of the limited nature and opacity of the information in the
public domain. The authors emphasised that the complex web of sub-contracting
and hidden nature of intra-company transactions makes it difficult to account for
all profit accrued by parent companies and establish the total cost of using private
finance. 
A similar analysis was conducted for road PPPs in Spain by Acerete et al.
(2009) who conducted a financial analysis of fifteen concession companies
operating 24 private toll roads. The authors found that despite the Spanish
government making generous loans to private contracts (known as participative
loans) the cost of private finance was estimated as more than twice that of public
finance. Cheaper finance as a result of government subventions contributed to
higher profits and returns to investors. The return on shareholder funds increased
from 8 per cent in 1995 to 11 per cent in 2003. The cost of capital was estimated at
9 per cent in the same year. The authors also noted the absence of important
information from the public domain and that there was less availability of
information in Spain compared to the UK. 
The tenor of these findings raises suspicions about the financial cost of PPP
contracts in the roads sector and the scope for achieving objectives such as better
VFM compared to conventional procurement methods. Moreover, they suggest the
need for further investigation into these issues. The remainder of this paper aims to
provide new evidence on issues including the financial cost of PPP contracts and
the relative cost of public versus private finance for public infrastructure. The paper
adopts the approach used by Shaoul et al. (2006) and Acerete et al. (2009) to
provide a financial analysis of road PPPs in Ireland. We concentrate on the eight
concession projects in operation at the end of 2010 and ignore the availability
payment based M50 PPP project for the purpose of this analysis.2 Our principal
data sources are the annual reports published by the NRA that contain information
on expenditure on PPP projects and the annual financial statements for each PPP
company that we sourced from the Companies Registration Office.
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V FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF ROAD PPPS IN IRELAND
It is widely acknowledged that the financial analysis of PPP contracts can be
obstructed by the absence of reliable data made available by public bodies and
private companies alike. In the case of Ireland the full business case for PPP,
including the expected costs and revenues, traffic flows (in the case of transport
projects), VFM assessments and public sector comparators are not placed in the
public domain for reasons such as commercial confidentiality and the risk that such
information may undermine competition for future contracts. Independent financial
analysis is also obstructed by the complex structure of PPP companies and their
reporting methods. Whilst private companies are regulated by national and inter -
national accounting regulators they maintain significant discretion and choice over
matters such as the aggregation of information and how it is disclosed and pre -
sented. In addition, SPVs “in particular take advantage of reporting rules to present
the minimum information permissible” (Stafford and Stapleton, 2017, p. 383).
In this study a number of issues relating to the disclosure and presentation stand
out. First, establishing basic data such as capital value is difficult, with the CSO,
DPER and the PPP company financial statements all providing conflicting figures
over the years. Second, the web of subcontracting means that there are many related
party transactions, which are unlikely to take place at arm’s length and therefore
create opportunities for hidden profits. Third, in most projects the public sector has
provided significant funds towards the construction and operation of the assets.
Finally, in four of the eight projects included in our analysis, significant losses have
been incurred to date with one company in negotiations with its lenders in relation
to restructuring its debt. The following sections outline the level of expenditure
committed by the NRA to each project, the financial structure of the PPP companies,
how each project has been financed and, finally, the financial performance of each
project.
VI EXPENDITURES BY THE NRA
Table 2 shows that payments to each of the road projects by the NRA to date amount
to over €2.7 billion and it is estimated that future commitments total €422 million.
Despite the investment of private finance, the public sector has made expenditures
on elements of roads projects such as the purchase of land, preliminary studies and
design necessary to identify the route, ground investigations and preparation of
statutory documents. Expenditures on these items are incurred irrespective of the
procurement method but it is worth noting that the extent of public expenditure
before contracting amounted to €1.17 billion (36.7 per cent of total payments by
the NRA). In addition, the NRA incurred ancillary costs (covering costs related to
activities such as project planning, financial, legal and technical advisory services,
etc.) which amounted to over €128 million up until 2010 (see notes to Table 2).
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The degree of information provided in the annual accounts of the National
Roads Authority appears to exceed that which is available in the UK as it provides
a breakdown by company which allows tracking of different projects. Also, the
structure of payments (other than construction payments) on hard-tolled schemes
in Ireland are less complicated than those that apply in the case of shadow-toll
schemes in the UK where payments cover items such as interest on DBFO finance,
shadow tolls and other costs such as capital charges payable on DBFO assets
(Shaoul et al., 2006). Moreover, NRA payments to PPP companies comprise
construction payments (essentially capital grants), operational payments and traffic
guarantee payments (in the case of two contracts). The data provided by the NRA
also include amounts of future commitments over the lives of contracts.
Construction payments of €1.05 billion account for 33 per cent of total NRA
payments (including projected future payments). The PPP companies have also
received operational payments of €463 million to date (17 per cent of total
payments to date). In addition, payments under traffic guarantee schemes have
accounted for 7.6 and 1.6 per cent of payments to date on the relevant schemes (M7
Limerick Tunnel and M3 Clonee-Kells respectively). 
It should be noted that the timing and magnitude of future payments is open to
negotiation and may vary significantly across projects. As PPP companies have
assumed demand risk (in six of the contracts covered) they may seek to alter the
profile of operational payments in the event of traffic falling below initial projected
levels. This has been a pertinent issue over the last number of years as falling traffic
volumes have increased incentives for PPP companies to seek a front-loading of
operational payments. If lower than expected traffic volumes persist there is also a
possibility that PPP companies will seek to renegotiate the levels of payments made
by the NRA. In that eventuality forward commitments will increase to levels above
those presented in Table 2 which will have implications for any VFM expected as
a result of using the PPP approach to procurement.
VII FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF PPP COMPANIES
As in other countries, the corporate structures underpinning the road PPP projects
we examine are complex and make any analysis of the activities and financial
performance of each road scheme burdensome. In each of the road projects that we
analyse, the PPP company that operates the asset is an SPV3 with most of the
operating and administrative functions subcontracted out to related group
companies, many of which are subsidiaries of the equity shareholders. The
construction of the asset is either subcontracted out to a subsidiary company of the
construction company equity sponsors, or to a related group company specifically
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3 The SPV company created for each project is a shell company whose only activities relate to the PPP
contract, with only a small number of employees in four cases and no employees in the other four cases.
created for the construction phase of the scheme (owned by the construction
companies that make up the equity owner consortium). The financing of the project
is also generally channelled through a specific finance company created to source
funds on behalf of the PPP company, or through the existing finance companies of
the equity shareholders involved in the consortium. 
Figure 1 provides a brief illustration of the corporate structure of the M7
Limerick tunnel scheme and lists the related companies where intercompany
transactions are recorded in 2015. An examination of the accounts for the related
holdings, finance and construction companies reveals further subcontracting out of
services and financing to other related subsidiaries of the equity shareholders that
further complicates a detailed financial analysis of the scheme. Although some of
the PPP companies that we examine do not have as complex a structure as the one
outlined in Figure 1, they all subcontract out the construction of the asset and much
of their administration/operation, as well as source their finances from a related
finance company or finance companies.
Figure 1: Corporate Structure of M7 Limerick PPP Scheme
Source: DirectRoute (Limerick) Ltd. financial statements for the year ended 31 December
2015.
Shaoul et al. (2006, p. 266) observe similar corporate structures in the eight
UK road DBFO projects that they examine and point out how such structures create
the possibility for transfer pricing and the recording of profits in related companies
rather than the PPP operating company. They highlight how this structure allows
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Related party name
DirectRoute (Limerick) Holdings Ltd.
DirectRoute (Limerick) Finance Ltd.
DirectRoute (Limerick) Ltd.
DirectRoute (Limerick) Construction Ltd.
Allied Irish Banks





John Sisk & Son Ltd.








Joint venture of construction shareholders
Shareholder of DirectRoute (Limerick) Holdings Ltd
Shareholder of DirectRoute (Limerick) Holdings Ltd
Shareholder of DirectRoute (Limerick) Holdings Ltd
Shareholder of DirectRoute (Limerick) Holdings Ltd
Shareholder of DirectRoute (Limerick) Holdings Ltd
Shareholder of DirectRoute (Limerick) Holdings Ltd
Related to PPP Roadholdings Ltd
Related to Lagan Project Investments Ltd
Related to Spandor Ltd
Related to Strabag AG
Related to Strabag AG
equity owners to profit from the PPP contract in multiple ways: (1) from profits
earned by the PPP company; (2) from profits earned by related subsidiary
companies that carry out work on behalf of PPP company; and (3) from interest on
shareholder loans to the PPP company (examined in more detail in the next section).
Accurately estimating these profits and the returns to shareholders’ funds is difficult
due to the fact that most of the companies they examined were exempt from
disclosing the magnitude of payments made to related parties.
We encountered similar issues in our analysis of the eight road concession
projects in operation by 2010. For most of the PPP company accounts that we
examined, only minimal information on transactions between related companies
are provided in the notes to the financial statements and it is generally not possible
to accurately track the exact nature of inter-company payments. Despite these
information difficulties it is still possible to conduct a detailed examination of the
financing and activities of the PPP companies in our sample from the available PPP
company financial statements and NRA annual reports. The following section
examines the financing of each scheme before we conduct an analysis of some key
financial performance indicators for each company.
VIII FINANCING PPP CONCESSIONS: THE MIX OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE
One of the principal objectives ascribed to PPP is that it enables the provision of
public infrastructure using private finance. It is argued that this confers obvious
advantages at times of severe constraints on public finance. Moreover, the
participation of private finance ensures that projects are rigorously appraised by
providers who take on project risks and therefore have incentives to ensure the
infrastructure is constructed and operated efficiently. In reality, PPP deals do not
necessarily rely fully on private finance as governments often provide an element
of public finance for PPP investments.
Table 3 shows the sources of finance for the construction of the eight PPPs
analysed. As noted earlier, the NRA provided over €1 billion in construction grants
to the PPP projects, accounting for over 36 per cent of the aggregate €2.88 billion
in financing required. The amounts contributed by the NRA to each project varied
from as little as 1.6 per cent in the case of the Dundalk Western Bypass to over 46
per cent in the cases of the M4 Kilcock-Kinnegad and M3 Clonee-Kells schemes.
The effective contribution of public finance to these projects is even greater if loans
from the EIB are taken into account. Table 3 shows that the EIB contributed finance
to seven of the eight projects examined, providing 50 per cent of the senior debt
raised in each case.
One of the notable features of the financing of road PPP projects in Ireland has
been the extremely small amount of ordinary share capital injected into the PPP
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companies by equity shareholders; the so-called ‘pinpoint’ equity model. For six
of the eight companies in our sample, paid up share capital does not exceed
€90,000. For the two projects where share capital is higher (M3 and M4
motorways), it still only accounts for just over 1 per cent of total financing in both
cases. Instead of direct share capital injections, shareholders in all cases have issued
shareholder loans to the PPP company, generally in the form of subordinated debt
with relatively high interest rates.4 These loans are usually made around the time
that projects become operational, and are generally the refinancing of short-term
equity bridge loans that fall due once the construction phase of each project has
been completed. There are obvious benefits to shareholders in pursuing this model
of financing, given that shareholder loans can start earning interest once operations
commence, whereas dividend payments are dependent on the company reaching
‘steady state’ profitability and servicing its debt regularly. In addition, the interest
payments on shareholder loans also have the benefit of reducing corporate tax
liabilities. 
Interestingly, the pinpoint equity model used in the projects we examine appears
to differ from what is generally recommended for hard toll schemes. According to
the OECD/ITF (2013: 28), tolled PPPs require a relatively larger share of equity in
order to reduce insolvency risk compared to what would be required in less risky
availability payment based contracts. Having more ‘skin in the game’ should, in
theory, increase the incentive of equity owners to ensure traffic/revenue forecasts
are more realistic and reduce the scope for strategic misrepresentation when bidding
for PPP contracts. The incentive for equity sponsors to underprice demand risk by
being overly optimistic in their traffic forecasts is an issue that is dealt with in detail
by Burke and Demirag (2015) in their analysis of demand risk in three road PPP
schemes in Ireland. They found that demand risk was aggressively priced by equity
sponsors in the three projects they examined in order to win the PPP contracts. 
While Burke and Demirag (2015) do not examine the issue of pinpoint equity
and incentives to price risk more accurately in their study, it is worth examining in
future research whether it is one of the factors that might have led to what appears
to be overly optimistic traffic forecasts in most of the eight hard toll PPP projects
that we examine. Although it can be argued that, in reality, equity owners have more
‘skin in the game’ through the subordinated loans that they provide to the PPP
projects, in our paper the fact that shareholders can immediately begin receiving
payments on the interest owed on these loans whether the company is profitable or
not arguably weakens the incentive to more accurately forecast revenues when
bidding for the contract. The high interest rate that is generally charged on
shareholder loans also has the effect of reducing PPP company tax liabilities and is
an easier way for shareholders to make a return on their investment. The high
interest payable on shareholder loans also has the effect of raising the overall cost
230                                     The Economic and Social Review
4 Except in the case of the three Celtic Roads Group projects – Dundalk, Waterford and Portlaoise – where
shareholder loans are non-interest bearing.
of capital for each project and makes it more difficult to accurately estimate the
returns to shareholders’ funds (examined later). 
Tracking where shareholder loans come from is difficult due to the structure
of each of the projects and the fact that loans are usually channelled through a
finance company related to the PPP company. It is, however, possible to obtain the
accounts of some of the Irish registered finance companies in order to examine the
interest rates charged on loans made to PPP companies and the source of the funds
used to make the loan. An interesting insight into the added benefits for shareholders
of using pinpoint equity contributions along with shareholder loans is provided by
the two Eurolink consortium controlled projects (M4 Kilcock-Kinnegad and M3
Clonee-Kells). An examination of the accounts of Financinfrastructures Ltd., a
finance company owned by Cintra Infraestructuras S.A. (the main shareholder in
each Eurolink project), along with the accounts for the M3 and M4 PPP companies,
reveals that in 2009, Financinfrastructures Ltd. borrowed just over €13 million
from the then operational M4 PPP company at an interest rate of 0.5 per cent below
the average monthly Euribor, and then loaned the same sum of money at an interest
rate of 8 per cent to the M3 PPP company.  
The financial engineering evident here allowed the shareholders to extract cash
at a low interest rate from one company without paying tax and to lend that money
to their other company at a high interest rate, thereby lowering its tax liabilities.
While this type of transaction may be common practice within large multinational
infrastructure companies, it raises obvious questions in relation to VFM in a PPP
context and raises the overall cost of capital for the projects in question. Although
beyond the scope of this paper, future research into the activities of all of the related
finance companies involved in the PPP projects examined in this paper would
provide a more accurate picture of how equity owners inject equity into and extract
money from the PPP companies that they control.
IX FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF ROAD PPP COMPANIES
Table 4 presents some basic financial indicators for the eight PPP companies for
the three most recent years where accounts are available (2014-2016). Four of the
projects are clearly in financial difficulty having incurred net losses in each year.
While losses are to be expected in the early years of operation for such projects,
each of the loss-making companies in Table 4 has yet to record a profit since
operations commenced in 2009/2010. The N25 Waterford Bypass project appears
to be in considerable difficulty having recorded a fixed asset impairment charge of
€36.5 million in 2014 and a further charge of €61.6 million in 2015 after the
company revised cashflow forecasts incorporating anticipated traffic volumes. The
company is currently engaging with lenders on a restructuring plan for the project
debt and it remains to be seen what type of a deal will be made. 
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In aggregate, over €1.2 billion in turnover has been generated by the eight
projects included in our analysis as of December 2016, although as highlighted in
Table 2 earlier, this figure includes over €463 million in operational payments from
the NRA plus almost €42 million in traffic guarantee payments to the Limerick
Tunnel and M3 Clonee-Kells projects. Interest payments account for over half of
the turnover generated across all projects which is to be expected given the high
level of debt financing involved in each project. Since most projects are in the early
years of operation the total amount of corporate tax paid out has been low and just
three companies have paid out dividends to date (totalling €19.1 million to date
for N1/M1 Dundalk, €17 million for M3 Clonee-Kells and €1.5 million in the case
of M4/M6 Kilcock-Kinnegad).
The scale of the accumulated losses experienced by the four loss-making
projects highlighted in Table 4 is considerable. Although losses are to be expected
in the early years of operation for such projects they are nonetheless relatively high
compared to those incurred by earlier projects such as the M4/M6 and N1/M1 in
their first years of operation. Although most PPP companies don’t provide a
breakdown of their turnover into toll income and operational payments from the
NRA, it is still possible to estimate this breakdown by comparing turnover in a
given year to the total operational payments paid out in the same year available
from the NRA annual reports. On this basis, it is clear that four of the five projects
that became operational from 2010 onwards are hugely reliant on operational
payments from the NRA as their main source of income. We estimate that approxi -
mately 62 per cent of the aggregate turnover earned to the end of 2016 on the M3
Clonee-Kells scheme came from NRA operational payments (67.4 per cent when
traffic guarantee payments are included). This figure stands at 24.9 per cent (46.5
per cent when traffic guarantee payments are included) for the M7 Limerick Tunnel
project and 25.6 per cent on the M7/M8 Portlaoise project. On the N6 Galway-
Ballinasloe project we estimate that NRA operational payments to date have
accounted for approximately 75 per cent of aggregate turnover by the end of 2016.5
Given that operational payments on, for example, the N6 scheme are due to
end before 2020, this raises obvious concerns over the viability of some of these
projects and the possibility that, in the absence of significant traffic growth, either
shareholders or debt financiers will have to restructure some of their debts, or
contracts will have to be renegotiated with the NRA. In this context it is worth
noting Burke and Demirag’s (2015) finding that some of the SPV members that
they interviewed as part of their analysis of demand risk in three Irish road PPP
projects believed that the Government would intervene in the event that traffic
levels were below forecast and PPPs were in financial difficulty. They argue that
such behaviour raises questions about 
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5 Annual accounts for the N6 project stopped providing a profit and loss account from 2015 onwards so
this estimate is based on a conservative estimate of toll revenue recorded in the 2014 accounts that assumed
a 3 per cent growth in toll revenues in 2015 and in 2016.
how risk is initially allocated in PPP and, consequently, it is also important
to consider how it affects the accountability, VFM and transparency of the
PPP process (Burke and Demirag, 2015: 203). 
Turning to the financial ratios presented in Table 5, we focus here only on the
four profitable projects as of the end of 2016. On the three projects that opened
prior to the economic crisis in 2008, each company very quickly began earning
significant operating profit margins and generating considerable returns on
shareholders’ funds which have raised the overall effective cost of capital in each
case. The M3 project which commenced operations in 2010 also immediately began
recording substantial after tax profits, however approximately €160 million of the
€240 million in aggregate turnover earned by the company between 2010 and 2016
came from operational and traffic guarantee payments from the NRA.
The effective cost of capital (debt and equity) is calculated (as an average) for
the four profitable companies in Table 6. It rose from 3.9 per cent in 2006 to 11.5
per cent in 2016 and averaged 7.9 per cent over the eleven-year period covered.
Given that the ten-year yield on Irish government bonds averaged 4 per cent over
the period in which the eight projects reached financial close, we estimate a
premium on private finance of approximately four per cent. This premium which
is essentially the price paid for risk transfer is within the range of 1.6 - 4 per cent
observed by Bain (2008) who reviewed a sample of studies of the premium on PFI
projects in the UK. It is worth noting that the actual cost of capital differential
between the public and private sectors is a contested issue in the PPP literature.
Whereas Shaoul et al. (2006) found that the risk premium on PFI road projects in
the UK rose from 3 per cent in 1997 to 11 per cent in 2002 resulting in a risk
premium of 6 per cent in the latter year, other writers such as Bain (2008) have
argued that the effective cost of capital gap is more modest than this study suggests.
Our analysis of road PPPs in Ireland suggests a risk premium of 4 per cent, but a
number of caveats should be highlighted. First, this estimate is based on four PPP
projects that have maintained profitability since commencing operations. Second,
these estimates were recorded over a period of severe economic recession and
subsequently lower levels of traffic flows. It remains to be seen how the effective
cost of capital changes on these hard-toll schemes in the coming years.
While the four loss-making companies to date are not included in our financial
analysis given they are only 7-8 years into the life of their contracts and it is too
early to say anything definitive about their performance, the scale of their losses to
date is nonetheless surprising. By the end of 2016 accumulated losses were over
€166.5 million on the N25 Waterford Bypass project, €56.7 million on the M7/M8
Portlaoise project, €55.9 million on the N6 Galway-Ballinasloe project and €45.6
million on the M7 Limerick Tunnel project. The Waterford PPP project is currently
in negotiations with lenders in relation to a restructuring of its debt. While the scale
of accumulated losses on the other three projects in financial difficulty is relatively
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lower, the loss on shareholders’ funds for these projects over the 2010-2016 period
is still significant and it is likely that some form of debt restructuring may need to
take place in each of the projects if current trends continue. 
X DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
PPP schemes account for approximately one-third of Ireland’s motorway network
and approximately 60 per cent of the capital value of Ireland’s relatively extensive
PPP programme. To date, however, the experience with the use of PPP in the Irish
roads sector has not been subjected to any form of in-depth review or analysis by
government bodies or independent researchers. This paper seeks to address this
deficit of knowledge by conducting a review of road PPP activity to date and a
financial analysis of PPP projects in operation by 2010.
A striking feature of our analysis is the revelation that road PPP projects are
mainly financed by the public sector. Our analysis has established that the public
sector has contributed €1.01 billion in construction payments, in addition to €1.17
billion spent on land acquisition costs. Although private finance contributed over
€1.8 billion of investment in the projects analysed, of this over €590 million was
borrowed from the EIB which is a major lender of public funds to the private PPP
companies. 
Furthermore, our financial analysis shows that just four of the eight projects in
our study were profitable at the end of 2016, with this group including the three
longest running projects and the M3 Clonee-Kells project which is heavily reliant
on large operational payments from the NRA. The other four loss-makers all
became operational in 2009/2010 and have accumulated large after tax losses to
date. While all of these projects opened during a major economic downturn, it
would still appear that these companies significantly overestimated traffic levels
when submitting their bids prior to the financial close of contracts in 2007, and it
remains to be seen whether they seek to re-negotiate terms with the NRA.
A key rationale for PPPs is to optimise risk allocation thereby incentivising
private operators to deliver infrastructure efficiently and achieve VFM. One way
of examining this is to address the differential between the cost of public and private
capital. Our analysis showed that the effective cost of capital for the four profitable
PPP companies averaged just under eight per cent suggesting a risk premium of
four per cent. While this risk premium is broadly in line with that previously found
for road projects in the UK, the case of Ireland differs significantly given the
substantial sums of money contributed by the public sector to most projects.
Lenders benefit from getting a sizeable risk premium even though the public sector
has contributed large construction and operational payments. This raises a legitimate
question as to whether significant risk has actually been transferred to the private
sector. When coupled with the issue of renegotiations with lenders on the loss-
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making projects, the ability for these projects to achieve VFM is called into
question.
In conclusion, the evidence produced in this paper points to a number of policy
recommendations. First, a government sponsored review of all PPP projects
(including those in the roads sector) is long overdue. Given that PPP has been an
important part of public investment policy in Ireland since 2000, there is a clear
need for a review of how the PPP model has performed. The state of play in the
Irish case stands in sharp contrast to that in the UK where Stafford and Stapleton
(2017) note that the National Audit Office (NAO) alone has published over 80
reports on PPP projects and policy. In this context, the history of PPP procurement
in the Irish context exhibits signs of a form of de-politicisation whereby
government, corporations, media and interest groups shift issues off the agenda of
political or policy debate (Willems and Van Dooren, 2016). 
Second, there is both justification and scope for providing much better public
access to financial information about PPP. Options in this regard include bringing
PPP companies within the remit of the Freedom of Information Act which is
currently confined to public authorities. One justification for such a measure is
provided by Stafford and Stapleton (2017) who argue that PPP companies receive
substantial hidden subventions and can therefore reasonably be considered as para-
statal companies that are de facto public authorities.
Third, given the competing calls for greater transparency on the one hand versus
the demands of interested parties for the protection of commercial confidentiality
on the other, Vining and Boardman (2008) and Siemiatycki (2007) recommend the
deposit and public availability of all contracts with the proviso that legitimate trade
secrets “should be protected through the sealing of specific contract provisions with
a neutral third party adjudicating the legitimacy of particular claims to secrecy”
(Vining and Boardman, 2008, p. 156).
Fourth, PPP companies should be contractually obliged to disclose information
that ensures the public can access clear and transparent data on the financial
performance of PPP companies that provide vital public services. Shaoul et al.
(2010, p. 238) suggest that such information should include “a breakdown of its
costs, the location of and the amount retained within a sinking fund and thus the
viability of the project and the company”. Public agencies should also disclose full
information on the breakdown of annual costs, including its monitoring costs,
performance deductions and any changes to contractual arrangements. 
The financial analysis conducted in this paper provides new insights into the
financial performance of PPPs in the Irish roads sector. It is, however, important to
be mindful of the limitations to this analysis. As four of the PPPs examined came
into operation in 2010 they are only beginning to reach a ‘steady state’ in their
operations. It is hoped that future research will extend the period of analysis. As
time elapses there will also be scope for in-depth case-based analysis of individual
projects. This type of financial analysis is critical for ensuring that decisions on
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how public money is allocated are viewed as legitimate by the public. However,
the challenges to financial analysis of future PPP projects will persist unless
policymakers make determined efforts to implement changes along the lines
recommended here. 
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